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Information Role of Analysts’ Target Prices: Event and Intra-day 
Analysis 
 
Fan Chen 
 
Abstract 
I have documented that target prices subsumed in downgrade recommendations are 
the most informative while target prices in coverage reiteration are the least 
informative. The First Call database enables me to extend the analysis to an intraday 
frequency. Conducting event studies using high frequency data, is even more critical 
given the advent of information technology systems has dramatically changed the 
landscape of stock trading. The modified approach to event study is relevant to the 
fast-changing trading environment in today’s capital market. For upgrades, there are 
significant positive market-adjusted returns lasting 20 minutes; for downgrades, there 
are significant negative market-adjusted returns lasting 25 to 35 minutes. By 
constructing portfolios on the basis of target price information measures (TP/P, 
ΔTP/TP-1   and ΔTP/P), I also document that the information subsumed in target price 
revision is more useful than target price alone. Furthermore, the dramatic rise in 
trading activity coupled with a shift in order imbalances implies that the market 
interprets recommendations with target price changes broadly as a liquidity event. 
More importantly, I find that target prices are informative both unconditionally and 
conditionally on the type of recommendations and rating revision at intraday 
frequency. The investors seek out more information from target price revisions when 
recommendations are unfavourable.  
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 1.   Introduction 
 
Analyst reports typically contain three summary components: an earnings forecast, 
a buy, sell, or hold recommendation, and a 12-month target price. This price depends 
on earnings forecast and some accounting ratios. Most of the previous papers focus 
mainly on the announcement effects of analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
recommendations. This paper studies the impact of analysts’ target price revisions on 
intraday and daily stock returns.  
    Most previous studies
1 on analyst reports examine revisions in only two of the 
summary elements: stock recommendations and earnings forecasts. In recent years, 
security analysts have increasingly disclosed target prices in reports, along with their 
stock recommendations and earnings forecasts. These target prices provide market 
investors with analysts’ most concise and explicit statement on the magnitude of the 
firms’ expected value. Despite the increasing prominence of target prices, their roles 
in conveying information to market investors and their value to the formation of 
equity prices have remained largely unexplored. We extend the research of analysts’ 
information role by incorporating the contents of target price rather than just the 
individual summary elements such as the stock recommendation.  
    “Target” or “objective” prices are often mentioned as firm’s expected value by 
analysts in their reports. The difference between the target prices and the recent 
transaction prices can be used to support the relevant recommendations. For instance, 
JP Morgan put a report on Alcoa Inc when the price was $36.85 and made a 
                                                            
1 Beginning from Lee (1986, 1987), studies of financial analyst behavior evolves into a cottage industry. 
A large body of articles have been devoted to different issues of financial analysts in equities market. 
For example: Bushan (1989), Barber and Loeffler (1993), Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), Greene and 
Smart (1999), Liang (1999), Michaely and Womack (1999), Jackson (2005), Frankel, Kothari, and 
Weber (2006). 
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 conclusion, "We continue to recommend Alcoa Inc with a price target of $48 per 
share. We believe that the stock is significantly undervalued at current levels."' Target 
price represents the analyst's valuation of the stock, and it proves that the Buy 
recommendation as one might anticipate. Understanding the standard wording of 
recommendations, market participants would perceive that a Buy or Strong Buy 
recommendation reflects a firm that the analyst believes is currently underpriced, a 
Hold recommendation representing a fairly priced firm, and a Sell recommendation 
representing an overpriced firm. Nevertheless, Sell recommendations are rather rare 
(Womack 1996, Stickel 1998). Hence, market participants tend to perceive Holds as 
Sells, and Buys as Holds. However, would an analyst announce a target price when he 
or she believes a stock is overvalued? This could not happen if previously studied 
optimistic bias in forecasts and recommendations also describes target prices (e.g., 
McNichols and O'Brien 1997). Theories for this optimistic bias contain a motivation 
by analysts to "curry favor with management" (Francis and Philbrick 1993) and 
improve brokerage house relationships (Lin and McNichols 1998). Consequently, it is 
quite likely that there is an asymmetric use of target prices to support stock 
recommendations. We would expect that downgrade with downward target price 
revisions would be the most credible signal. 
     Gaining an insight into the information role of target prices in financial markets is 
crucial for several reasons. Firstly, since target prices are often calculated as the 
product of forecasted earnings and a financial ratio such as an earnings yield 
(Fernandez (2001), Bradshaw(2002) and Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2002)), evidence 
that target prices are informative in conjunction with stock recommendations supports 
the argument that market participants consider price formation by analyst’s 
recommendations are valuable. Secondly, if target prices subsume incremental 
2 
 information value, it would indicate that results in previous study on analysts’ stock 
recommendations might be partially attributed to the value that investors place on 
price targets. Lastly, an exploration into the information role of target prices enables 
us to evaluate the view that target prices provide little or no value to the investors. 
Specifically, some argue that stock recommendations may completely contain the 
information in target prices, because the latter are decided after the stock 
recommendation and earning forecast have been set. It might also be argued that 
target prices are uninformative and only serve as vehicle to raise an individual 
analyst’s stature, or that they may not be easily perceived by market participants since 
they are not necessarily associated with an “end date.” 
    One disadvantage in exploring stock recommendations in isolation is that there are 
a limited number of recommendation categories. More specifically, although analysts 
use five distinct recommendations—strong buy, buy, hold, sell, and strong sell, they 
are generally unwilling to use the two negative ratings (see, e.g., Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols, and Trueman, 2001; Mikhail, Walther, Willis, 2004). By incorporating 
gradations in the analysts’ price target, we overcome the disadvantage of limited, 
discrete recommendation categories. 
    This paper attempts to address the following research issues that are of interest to 
both the financial industry and the academia:  
1)  The relationship between the change of target price and intraday stock returns, 
and the process by which information of target price revision is reflected in the 
stock price over a few days; 
2)  The magnitude of stock returns when target prices are made under four different 
scenarios: upgrade, downgrade, initiation, and reiteration; 
3)  The magnitude of stock returns in response to target price revisions when analyst 
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 ratings are reiterated as buy, sell, or hold; 
4)  Announcement effects of coverage initiation and the differential information 
content of target price; 
5)  The information contents of target price changes announced during and outside 
the regular trading hours; 
6)  Intraday informative of target price revisions conditionally and unconditionally 
on the announcement of recommendation (upgrade and downgrade) and change 
of ratings; 
     We start our analysis with an investigation of stock price reactions associated with 
and subsequent to target price announcements. We investigate the 7-day cumulative 
abnormal returns to target price, particularly when we distinguish between those 
released with recommendations and those that are released without recommendations. 
If market participants consider analysts price targets as informative, we should obtain 
significant price reactions surrounding the announcements. Since target prices are 
generally announced in conjunction with stock recommendations, we investigate 
whether target prices are incrementally informative under different recommendation 
categories (initiation, reiteration, upgrade and downgrade). We would expect to see 
that target prices are incrementally informative, conditional on contemporaneously 
issued stock recommendations. 
     We next examine the intra-daily returns around analysts’ target price revisions. 
Busse and Green (2002) find that profit opportunities dissipate within seconds 
following the televised broadcast of analyst recommendations. Kim, Lin, and Slovin 
(1997) examine the intra-daily market reaction to the announcement of an initiation of 
coverage (an initial buy recommendation) that is published on the Dow Jones News 
Wire. They find that surrounding the opening trade in each market, there is a 
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 statistically significant price reaction (3.5%) to the initiation of coverage, which they 
contribute to clients of analysts’ firms trading on the information advantage before it 
hits the news wires. The magnitude of abnormal returns is consistent with Womack 
(1996), nevertheless, Kim, Lin, and Slovin (1997) show that nearly all of the 
abnormal returns are captured in the opening trade. In our examination of intra-daily 
returns, we discover that target prices do appear to bring new information to the 
market. 
      We establish that analysts’ target price revisions have an immediate impact on the 
market when they are released with stock recommendations. Investors who examine 
recommendations and have access to analysts’ target price should consider both when 
making investment decisions. We document that analysts’ recommendations with 
target announcements are more valuable than the recommendations alone. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 we present a brief 
review of the related research of our study. Section 3 reports the sample. Section 4 is 
about the methodology we apply in this paper. Section 5 provides results and analysis. 
Conclusions are offered in section 6.  
 
2.    Related Research and Literature 
 
    Financial  analysts,  serving  in  brokerage houses, independent research institutes, 
fund corporations and banks, play important roles in allocating resources in capital 
markets. They are primary information intermediaries in the market: collecting private 
information, forecasting firms’ prospects, and conducting retrospective analysis that 
interprets past events (Beaver (1998), p.10). Their labours improve the informational 
efficiency of the capital markets (Frankel et al. (2006)).  
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     There are hundreds of equity research firms in the US and a study by Johnson 
(2006) shows that spending on equity research is valued at 10 to 20 billion dollars in 
2006. If indeed investment firms and pension funds are willing to pay, directly or 
indirectly, good money to security analysts, then it is no coincidence that a growing 
body of literature is devoted to studying the role of analysts in affecting the 
information efficiency of stock markets. 
        Lee (1986, 1987) documents that the value of analyst’s recommendation is 
positively related to the cost of information, consistent with Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) 
theorem. Analysts expend considerable resources to work out the research reports. In 
a competitive and rational market, this costly activity must be compensated in the 
form of underwriting fees, trading profits, and commissions from trading (Womack 
(1996)).  Analysts publicly disclose their reports only if the expected benefit of doing 
so is greater than the cost of reports.  For example, Womack (1996) demonstrates that 
a change of recommendation causes an average price response of 3 to 5 percent over a 
3-day horizon. Beneish (1991) and Stickel (1995) demonstrate similar findings with 
regard to the magnitude of price reaction to analysts’ recommendations. 
The research by Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006) suggests that investors 
should pay more attention to the revisions by highly rated analysts, especially those 
who have spent more years in the profession and who are affiliated to prime 
brokerage houses. Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) construct portfolios every 
quarter on the basis of consensus recommendation levels and find a 2.3% bias 
between the performance of most and least favourably recommended portfolios over 
the six-month horizon. 
Juergens (1999) provides intraday evidence of the informativeness of analysts’ 
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 recommendations. His research supports the notion that market reacts quickly to 
analysts’ recommendations regardless of whether there is public news. The intraday 
analysis in Libby, Mathieu, and Robb (2002) show that the quoted bid-ask spreads are 
wider and depths are reduced before the release of earnings announcement.
2 Green 
(2006) finds evidence that there is significant information asymmetry prior to 
analysts’ announcements of their ratings. Moreover, subscribers of analyst news 
services can earn an average two-day return of 1.02%, after controlling for transaction 
costs.  
Papers on the informativeness of analyst’s target price, however, are few. Brav 
and Lehavy (2003) show that target prices significantly affect the market price over 
and above the issuance of stock recommendations. Bradshaw (2002) uses a sample of 
103 sell-side analysts’ reports to examine the joint impact of target price and stock 
rating. He concludes that target prices are positively correlated with analysts’ 
recommendations. Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005) study the impact of target price 
conditional on the release of other information (earnings forecast and 
recommendations), and find that target prices do provide useful information to the 
market. 
On the other hand, a study by Bonini, Zanetti, and Bianchini (2005) casts doubt 
on the informativeness of target price. For stocks traded on Borsa Italiana, they find 
persistent and large errors in the target price in forecasting future stock price. 
Bradshaw and Brown (2006) also show evidence of the inability of analysts to 
accurately predict future prices. Thus, the informativeness of target price is still an 
                                                            
2 The difference between the specialist’s posted bid price and ask price for the share in which they 
specialize, known as the bid–ask spread. The sum of the number of shares available at the bid and ask 
price is known as quoted depth (Lee, Mucklow, and Ready 1993). 
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 open question and this paper attempts to provide some answers by examining the 
response of stock price to the release of target price revision. 
 
3.    Data and Sample Selection 
 
In this section, we describe the data used in this study. Additionally, we provide 
the procedures that how we identify the firms and standardize the brokerages’ 
language of recommendations used in this sample. We collect the recommendation 
information from briefing.com, which is adopted by the online edition of Wall Street 
Journal. According to the data, there are four kinds of analyst actions: Coverage 
Initiation, Coverage Reiteration, Downgrades and Upgrades. For the sample of 
201,340 observations in the panel A of table 1, there are 46,507 Coverage Initiations, 
76,640 Coverage Reiterations, 41,821 Downgrades and 36,372 Upgrades. We 
separate the data into this category respectively. The time stamps of our data are from 
Jan, 1997 to Dec, 2006. The recommendation-- Coverage Reiteration is available 
from Jan, 2000 and it includes the most observations each year. The total number of 
recommendations increases in each year of the sample. There is a dramatically 
increase in the number of recommendations per firm between 1999 and 2000, at least 
twice over the time. The median value of firm size is also reported in the table.  
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
In panel B, we find one pattern that favourable (buy or hold) recommendations 
are much more pervasive than unfavourable (sell) ones. The percentage of buy to sell 
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 recommendations in this sample is more than 30 times. This percentage is much 
bigger than the percentage in upgrade and downgrade. Womack (1996) shows that 
this ratio at about 7 to 1. Pratt (1993) finds that Zacks Investment Research estimates 
this ratio at 10 to 1. This pattern is consistent with prior studies. The detailed 
interpretations of this buy-sell asymmetry can be found in Womack (1996).  
We identify the firms by the ticker. It happens that the same ticker represents 
different firms. The solution we find is merging the data from briefing.com with the 
data from CRSP by the identical date and ticker to get the cusip and permno. And 
then we download the event day data (holding-period return) from the CRSP by 
permno. We also find some firms with two cusips (very few) which means that the 
firm lists in two different stock exchange markets. We need to consider both of these 
two stocks. We calculate holding-period abnormal return on a net-of-market basis, 
where our proxy for the market portfolio is the CRSP value-weighted index. 
The most common stock rating system consists of the ratings "buy," "hold," and 
"sell." Brokerage houses use a slightly expanded system to express similar ratings 
change in our data, such as "buy," "attractive," "neutral," "unattractive," and "sell." 
The information of the rating system in the briefing.com is far from enough to 
distinguish the differences among these languages. We find that the database-- 
I/B/E/S which provides the original recommendation of each broker. The variable 
BTEXT in I/B/E/S represents Broker Text. It is the original recommendation received 
from the contributor, in their text. I/B/E/S Text - Since many brokers have different 
ratings, I/B/E/S develops a standard set of recommendations, each with an individual 
numeric value: 1-Strong Buy, 2-Buy, 3-Hold, 4-Underperform and 5-Sell. Each 
recommendation collected from the contributors is mapped to one of the I/B/E/S 
standard ratings. We can translate the different recommendation languages which 
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 used in the original data into the standard ratings on the basis of this principle. We 
consider both strong buy and buy recommendations as buy in our analysis. 
Underperform and sell are both considered as sell. Womack (1996) and Green (2006) 
categorize the recommendation changes based on the same principle. Thus, we can 
categorize the data we collect from briefing.com into the following recommendation: 
Buy, Sell, and Hold. 
We obtain intra-daily data from the NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. We 
exclude all the transactions outside the regular trading hour (from 9:30 to 16:00). It 
contains time-stamped transaction data for stocks on the NYSE, ASE and NASDAQ 
stocks. For the exact time of the release of analyst report, we rely on First Call 
database. The first time stamp is critical in our intraday event study of target price 
revisions. We merge this data source with the data we collected from Briefing.com by 
selecting records that have identical ticker symbol, date, and brokerage house identity. 
Finally, we can get 7197 observations. The time interval of these observations is from 
1999 to 2006. 
 
4.    Methodology 
 
   In addition to the traditional daily event study, this paper uses event study methods 
to analyze the price reactions to analysts’ announcements at the intraday frequency. 
The advent of information technology systems has dramatically changed the 
landscape of stock trading. More and more traders have access to important 
information these days. Whenever some news hit the wire, the price reaction ought to 
occur a lot quicker than before, and it is therefore important to examine the price 
impact tens of minutes before and after the information arrives. For robustness check 
10 
 and to relate to existing literature, we also conduct the standard event study at the 
daily frequency. 
    We use several different sources of historical data in our empirical study. First, we 
collect the target price information from briefing.com, which is adopted by the online 
edition of Wall Street Journal. Second, for the event day data (holding-period return), 
we rely on CRSP - Daily Extract with Time Window database. This query provides 
daily data for each firm for a selected interval window. To standardize the Brokerage 
houses’ ratings, we depend on the database I/B/E/S which provides the original 
recommendation of each brokerage house. 
    For the exact time of the release of analyst report, we rely on First Call database. In 
this database, the time stamp specifies when the analyst published the report. This 
time stamp is critical in our intraday event study of target price revisions. We merge 
these two data sources by selecting records that have identical ticker symbol, date, 
and brokerage house identity. In calculating intraday abnormal returns,  the  S&P  500  
index  cannot  be  used  directly  as  a benchmark,  because  the  intraday  changes  of  
the  index  are  significantly  less  frequent  than  the intraday changes for the added 
stocks. The closest substitute for the S&P 500 index that is traded as a stock and is 
also very liquid is the SPIDER (SPY) fund
3. Since this fund is actively traded, it avoids 
the stale price effect of the S&P 500 index
4. All the trades recorded on each day are 
collected from the TAQ Database for the sample of firms and for the SPY. The 
official US starting time is 09:30 and the official ending time is 16:00. There are also 
pre- and post-market close trades reported before and after this interval. Since they are  
                                                            
3Spider tracks the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Stock Price Index. It is an ETF (Exchange 
Traded Fund) that represents ownership in the S&P 500 Index. 
4 See Atchison et al. (1987) for a discussion of the spurious autocorrelation in index returns due to 
nonsynchronous trading. 
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 executed  outside  the  current market hours  (but  within  the  market  reporting  
hours),  they  are  not  included  in  the  analysis. We keep those records with a TAQ 
correction indicator of 0 (regular trade) and when possible a 1 (trade later corrected). 
We also excluded any transaction with a sale condition of Z, which is a transaction 
that reported on the tape out of time sequence. Additionally, we construct portfolios to 
perform cross-sectional analysis, so as to shed light on different price reactions of 
analysts’ most and least favoured stocks. 
 
5.   Results and Analysis 
 
5.1 Market Reaction to Target Price Announcements at Daily 
Frequency 
 
    As the beginning of our study, we capture the market impact of target price by 
examining daily returns. As mentioned above, we collect daily stock returns from the 
CRSP - Daily Extract with Time Window. We calculate holding-period abnormal 
return on a net-of-market basis, where our proxy for the market portfolio is the CRSP 
value-weighted index. In order to have an in-depth study of the information content of 
recommendation (coverage initiations and coverage reiterations), we have broken 
down them into three different subgroups: Buy, Sell, Hold. By differentiating between 
recommendation categories, we can have a more accurate understanding of which 
categories have the largest impact on daily returns. Individual brokerage houses use 
many different means of rating their stocks. We consider both strong buy and buy 
ratings as buy in our analysis. Underperform and sell are both considered as sell. 
12 
 Thus, we can categorize the data we collect from briefing.com into the following 
ratings: Buy, Sell, and Hold. 
In order to explore the impact of target prices on stock returns, we begin our 
analysis by examining a 7-day holding period abnormal return around the release of 
recommendations with target prices. To help understanding the information of target 
prices, we also calculate the return of stock around the release of recommendations 
without target prices. One point need to pay attention, some firms may have different 
recommendations at the same day due to different brokerage houses. It also may have 
target price of one recommendation, but not have of other recommendations at the 
same day. We consider it as the one with target price. As a first step in our analysis, 
we examine the magnitude of stock returns in response to target price revisions when 
analyst ratings are reiterated and initiated as buy, sell, or hold. Our evidences are 
supportive of the notion that the market treats an analyst recommendation differently 
based on whether a recommendation release with or without target price. Table 2 and 
Table 3 present results of the category and their corresponding holding period 
abnormal return.  
 
[Insert Table 2 and 3 Here] 
 
We show that the holding period abnormal returns are significantly positive for 
positive initiations of coverage (buy) and positive reiteration, and significantly 
negative for negative initiations and reiterations of coverage (sell). Interestingly, it is 
still significantly negative for neutral initiations and reiterations of coverage (hold). 
The results are reported in Table 2 and Table 3. In table 2, comparing the different 
recommendations in the same ratings, we find that the magnitude of returns for 
13 
 coverage initiation is larger than reiteration for positive rating (buy) at t=0. It is the 
same at t=1 and t=2. It is smaller than coverage reiteration for negative rating (sell) at 
t=0, 1, 2 and 3. As to the neutral rating (hold), it is larger than coverage reiteration. 
Positive rating (buy) released in conjunction with target price earn a larger return than 
the rating without price target. Neutral ratings (hold) in conjunction with target price 
earn a larger return than the rating without target price. These results can lead us to 
draw the following conclusions: recommendation of coverage initiation is more 
informative (bigger impact on returns) than coverage reiteration; from the panel A and 
B of figure 1, it can be observed that 7-day cumulative abnormal returns for coverage 
initiation are bigger than coverage reiteration for all the ratings. It indicates that 
coverage reiteration associated with price target is the least informative. This finding 
is consistent with the previous study focused on the information role of stock 
recommendation. Previous work (e.g., Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001)) 
has documented that recommendation reiterations are the least informative, as is 
evident in the economically small magnitude of 7-day cumulative return in panel B of 
figure 1. Positive rating released independently of target prices are less informative 
(lower impact on returns) than rating released in conjunction with target price, while 
neutral rating is the opposite. With regard to the negative rating (sell), it depends on 
the kind of recommendations. If it is coverage initiation, the target price is more 
informative. If it is coverage reiteration, it is less informative. We perform difference 
of means tests and median tests to determine differences between event day returns 
for the above pairs of recommendation. The results are reported in table 5. For each 
rating of recommendations in the event day, we use two sided student t-statistic test to 
test the differences of means of the recommendations with and without target price, as 
well as Wilcoxn sign ranked test to test the differences of median values. The results 
14 
 are reported in table 5.  With the exception of neutral rating of initiation, results of 
other categories are statistically significant, indicating that there is a significant 
difference between the returns in the other categories. All theses evidences lend 
strong support to the point that target price do subsume incremental information for 
coverage initiation and positive rating of reiteration. Target price subsumed in 
coverage initiation is more informative than coverage reiteration. For negative rating 
of coverage reiteration, target price does not provide incremental information since 
the average return of recommendation with target price is smaller than the 
recommendation without target price. The test of differences of medians and means 
(the 6
th row of table 5) suggests that they are statistically different from each other. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
Next we determine the magnitude of the return under upgrades and downgrades 
when they occur independently or concurrently with the target price. Consistent with 
the previous studies, we obtain significant positive returns for upgrades and 
significant negative returns for downgrades. Panel C of Figure 1 shows that investors 
can earn economically significant abnormal returns during 7-day window around the 
dissemination of a recommendation in the direction of that recommendation. From the 
Table 3, it can be seen that there is a significant positive return 4.09% for 
recommendation upgrades and significant negative return -5.10%   for 
recommendation downgrades at t=0  when the recommendations occur concurrently 
with the target price. The 4-day holding period return of upgrades 4.79% is larger than 
the 11-day event window returns of 1.16% (Stickel (1995)) or 3-day returns of 3.0% 
(Womack (1996)). We also list the recommendations without target price. These 
15 
 results are also reported in Table 3. At t=0, upgrades released in conjunction with 
target price earn 4.09%, while upgrades released independent of target price have 
returns 3.16%. The test (upgrade) reported in table 5 shows that these two returns are 
statistically different from each other. Downgrades released with (without) target 
price have return -5.10%(-4.51%). Each of these is statistically significant.  The 
results (downgrade) reported in table 5 also indicate that the means of returns are 
different from each other. The test of the median values in table 5 still shows that the 
market response to the target price cannot be overlooked. All of these findings support 
our previous conclusion that the information subsumed in target price cannot be 
ignored.  Hence, anyone who investigates the impact of analysts’ recommendations 
on market prices should also consider the target prices made by analysts as well. In 
the following intraday study, we apply this finding in our later study. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
To test for the robustness of this result, we perform the following test. We divide 
the sample by year, and calculate the holding period abnormal returns at t=0. The 
results are reported in the Table 4. We plot the Figure 2 based on the data from the 
Table 4. With the exception of 2002 in upgrades and 2003 in downgrades, the results 
hold across the remaining years. These results lead us to conclude that analysts’ 
recommendations (upgrades and downgrades) released independently of target prices 
are less informative (lower impact on returns) than recommendations released in 
conjunction with target prices.  
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
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 [Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
5.2 Market Reaction to Target Price Announcements at Intra-daily 
Frequency 
 
In order to more accurately detect the impact of analysts’ target prices on stock 
returns, we examine intra-daily returns surrounding the release time of target price 
revisions. Revisions data with accurate time stamps can help us to get sharper 
inferences than in earlier studies.  
For the exact time of the release of analyst report, we rely on First Call database. 
Prior studies consider the time stamps as approximations due to the data constraints. 
For example, Womack (1996) and Juergens (2000) states that during time periods of 
their studies, 1989 through 1991 and 1993 through 1996, analysts’  report was made 
available to clients approximately one or two hours until it was available on the First 
Call system. Juergens (2000) examine the information subsumed in analyst 
recommendations at approximate time that the information is transmitted to the 
market. The advent of information technology systems has dramatically improved the 
data collection and dissemination procedures of First Call. Currently, analysts 
typically distribute their research directly to First Call after they receive approval 
from the brokerage house’s compliance sector. Our data ranges from 1999 to 2006. 
We provide a description of the target price in Table 6. In the table 7, we construct 
one measure of the information content of analysts’ target prices denoted by 
target_change, ΔTP/TP-1, is the difference between the current and previous target 
price released by the same brokerage house, scaled by the previous target price. The 
rating_change is the difference between the current and prior rating. The negative 
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 value of the rating_change denotes that the recommendation is upgrade. Panel A of 
table 6 presents the average target price changes conditional on the associated 
recommendation revisions. The frequency and the percentage of the observations are 
also reported in the table. Compared with other rating change, only the observations 
of rating change -1,-2, 1, and 2 are enough to draw efficient conclusions. The average 
target price change is consistent with the direction of the rating change. The higher 
the rating change, the bigger the target price change. For example, an upgrade of 1 has 
an average target price change of 21.69%, which is smaller than an upgrade of 2 
(25.27%).  It can be seen that the average target price change is consistently positive 
for upgrades (negative rating change) and negative for downgrades (positive rating 
change). Panel B of table 6 reports the average rating changes conditional on the 
magnitude of the target price change. In Panel B, we can find the same feature of the 
data. The higher target price change is followed by the bigger rating change. These 
facts suggest that the target price and recommendations contain much of the same 
information content. In our later study, we will gain a further insight into the different 
information role of these two information sources.  
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
5.2.1 Descriptions of Variable for Target Price Information Measure  
 
    To examine the intra-day information content of analysts’ target prices, we develop 
three alternative measures. TP/P, is the ratio of the target price to the stock price of 
the last transaction just before the target price announced. The transaction is just 
several seconds before the announcement; some are even traded at the time when the 
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 announcements are published. For the stock with the announcement outside the 
regular market hour, we pick the price of the first transaction traded after 9:30 am. 
This ratio can be considered as the analysts’ stated forecast of the firms’ return. Since 
we intend to explore more accurately the informative of the target price, we choose 
the price in the intra-day interval to see the reaction of the market. In Brav and 
Lehavy (2003)’s work, they choose the stock price two days before the announcement 
to explore the daily and monthly reaction of the market.c ΔTP/TP-1, denoted as the 
change in the brokerage house target price. It measures the magnitude of the revision 
on the target price, which can help to explore the reaction of the market in response to 
target price revisions. ΔTP/P is used to study whether the released target price relative 
to the prior target price issued by the same brokerage house contains information.  
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics on the three information measures in 
detail. The statistics show that the distribution of the Target_change and Target_price 
are right skewed. The average (median) percentage change of target price is 1.84% 
(0%), indicating that analysts probably do not revise the target price dramatically. 
Nevertheless, analysts are rather optimistic about the value of firms in one year since 
target price measures the analysts’ one year expected value of one firm.  The target 
price is 20% higher relative to the stock price on average, indicating that analysts’ 
mean target price for these firms are 20% above the recent trading prices. And the 
median is 16% higher compared to the stock price. The third column describes the 
change of target price scaled by the stock price. The average (median) is -12.8% 
(0%). 
 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
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5.2.2 Intra-daily Returns 
 
    Since we have documented that the recommendations in presence of target price 
would be more informative, we will focus on the investors’ reaction to 
recommendation in conjunction with target price in our following analysis. As a first 
step in the analysis of intra-daily reaction, we use the return proxy for the investors’ 
reaction to the news. There are two kinds of the report due to the timing of the analyst 
report: regular market hour (from 9:30 am to 16:00 pm) and outside of the regular 
market hour (16:00 pm to 9:30 am of the next day). Roughly 75% (5517 out of 7197) 
of the analyst reports in the sample are released outside the regular market hour. This 
finding is consistent with the work of Green (2006). As a first step in the analysis of 
intra-daily returns, we separate the data into the upgrade and downgrade. We calculate 
intra-daily returns for the 5-minute intervals in 40-minute after the recommendation 
release. The 5-minute intra-daily market-adjusted returns are calculated by using the 
following equations: 
(3)                   
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Where    is the 5-minute return for each stock i, 
 is the 5-minute return for 
the SPY,
    ,  is the price from the trade at time t+5, t is the time when the 
target price is released, 
 is the market-adjusted return for each stock i.
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    A 5 minute grid is constructed using previous-tick method which means if there is 
no transaction at that time grid, the nearest previous transaction record is used. The 
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 first observation of the day occurring just after 9:30 was used for the 9:30 grid time. 
From this grid, 5 minute market-adjusted intraday log returns are constructed. For 
recommendations that are released after the market closes or before the open, post-
release returns are the returns from the first 40 minutes of trading after the next 
sequential open. 
Table 8 and 9 reports the results of intra-daily market-adjusted returns of 
recommendations in the presence of target price. Using the above equations, if the 
report is published during the market hour, we compute intra-daily market-adjusted 
returns for the 5-minute intervals over the period beginning 40 minutes prior and 
ending 40 minutes subsequent to the firm’s target price announcement; if the report is 
published after the market closes or before the open, we compute the overnight return 
and intra-daily market-adjusted returns for the 5-minute intervals over the period 40 
minutes subsequent to the firm’s target price announcement.  Panel A of figure 3 plots 
the cumulative market-adjusted returns for the 5-minute intervals over the period 40 
minutes following the announcement. It can be observed there is a significant upward 
trend of return for upgrade and downward trend of return for downgrade. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
 
For the sample of announcements published outside the trading hour, the overnight 
market-adjusted return is 3.31% (p-value<0.0001) for upgrade recommendation and -
5.26% (p-value<0.0001) for downgrade recommendation. We find a statistically 
positive and significant abnormal return of 0.18% for upgrade, and statistically 
negative return of -0.66% for downgrade at time t=5. The pattern of the return persists 
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 for 20 minutes for upgrade and 35 minutes for downgrade. The pattern and levels of 
significance are more pronounced for downgrade. For the sample of announcements 
published outside the trading hour, we find a similar pattern with the first sample: 
statistically positive and significant return of 0.11% (p-value<0.0001) for upgrade and 
statistically negative return of -0.12% (p-value<0.0001) for downgrade. The pattern 
and levels of significance are less obvious than the sample of announcements 
published outside the trading hour. It can be seen that there are also significant pre-
recommendation release time returns. From -40 to -5, the pattern and levels of returns 
are more pronounced than the post-recommendation time returns. Most of the pre-
release time returns are significant at traditional confidence levels. It is probably that 
there exists information leakage before the announcements. For example, institutional 
investors pay fees to the brokerage to use the database and are more likely to know 
the detailed information of analysts’ report. Green (2006) document that early access 
to stock recommendation benefits brokerage firm clients with information in advance 
to trade. Besides, First Call’s primary customers are brokerage firms and institutional 
investors. The incremental investment value can be perceived as the compensation for 
the fees paid to the brokerage by clients. 
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
In this part of study, our goal is to investigate which target price information 
measure is the most informative at intraday frequency. We have developed three 
information measures: TP/P, ΔTP/TP-1   and ΔTP/P. We calculate the market-adjusted 
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 return around each announcement and present mean returns for portfolios sorted by 
the magnitude of the related information content measure of target price. Raw 
cumulative return is calculated as the difference between price change from t=-35,-
30…40 relative to time t=-40. These results are reported in table 10, 11 and 12. From 
the results reported in table 10, it can be seen that the average raw returns around 
target price revisions are raising in the favorableness of the target price revisions. The 
pattern is consistent at each time t. It can be observed that the 80-minute market 
adjusted returns of the portfolios range from -4.44% to 2.20% with target price 
revisions ranging from -52% to 67%. At the insignificant target price revisions 
(quintile=6), the portfolio’s performance is statistically and economically insignificant 
while the target price revision only equals 2%. This pattern is also pronounced in the 
portfolios ranked on the basis of ΔTP/P.  While the mean 80-minute market adjusted 
returns increase in the percentage of TP/P ranging from -1.73% to -0.65%, the pattern 
and levels of significance are less pronounced than the other two information 
measures. With the exception of quintile 1,2 and 3 (the 3 smallest TP/P), all the other 
portfolios are statistically and economically insignificant, indicating that this 
information measure is not so useful as the other two measures. Consequently, we 
believe that the information subsumed in target price revision is more useful than 
target price alone. Investors are more likely to respond to the information contained in 
the target price revision. Which measure is the most informative among the other two 
measures? Figure 4 plots average market buy-and-hold market returns for the period 
beginning forty minutes prior and ending forty minutes subsequent to the firm’s target 
price announcement. We can see that the measure ΔTP/TP-1   is more informative than 
measure ΔTP/P since it has a big cumulative market-adjusted return.  
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 [Insert Table 10 Here] 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
 
5.2.3 Trading Activity surrounding the Announcements    
 
    In the following analysis, we link the announcement of information to volume and 
order imbalance through analysis of the impact of recommendations. There is a 
considerable literature on the presence of intra-daily patterns in market variables, 
including returns, volume, and spreads (Harris (1986), Smirlock and Starks (1986), 
Jain and Joh (1988)). There are also some studies trying to incorporate different 
measures of information, like public news announcements from news wire services 
(Brock and Kleidon (1992), Mitchell and Mulherin (1994), and Berry and Howe 
(1994)), to explain these regularities existed in financial markets. Green (2006) 
studied the change of trading activity (volume and order imbalance) due to the 
announcement of recommendation published outside the trading hour. He found that 
there is a dramatic increase of trading volume following the recommendations 
(upgrade and downgrade). Additionally, dollar order imbalances are negative for 10 to 
30 minutes subsequent to a downgrade recommendation; the pattern and magnitude of 
significance are less appreciable than for upgrades. He focused on the 
recommendation released outside the regular trading hour. It raises an interesting 
question concerning the impact on trading activity before and after the 
announcements if the recommendations are disseminated during the market hour. The 
timing of recommendations available in First Call database enables us to study this 
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 issue. If information arrival is non-random in nature, the trading activity should 
behave the same. If the increased trading activity is motivated by recommendations 
changes, we would expect to see more buyer-initiated trades following upgrades and 
the opposite for downgrades. More trading volumes would also be predicted due to 
the arrival of the information. 
To measure the percentage of order imbalance, we use the tick test.
5 Lee and Ready 
(1991) shows that “tick test” provides the best way to classify the trades as buys or 
sells given that quotes are often recorded before the trade that triggered them and that 
traders are usually inside the spread. The tick rule classification is on the basis of 
price movements relative to previous transactions
6. The rule classifies a trade as a 
buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) if the transaction is above (below) the previous trade. 
If there is no price change but the preceding change was uptick (downtick), then the 
trade is classified as a buy (sell). Using alternative rules
7 such as Ellis, Michaely, and 
O’Hara (2000) or excluding trades inside the posted quotes, which may be harder to 
classify correctly, does not appreciably change the results.
8 
                                                            
5 Finucane(2000) documents that tick test can provide better estimates of effective of effective spreads 
and signed volume than Lee and Ready’s (1991) method. He employs data that identifies trade 
direction and compares actual trade direction to the direction predicted by the tick test, Lee and 
Ready’s (1991) algorithm, and the reverse tick test. He finds that tick test and Lee and Ready’s (1991) 
can correctly identify trade direction more than 83% of the time. But researchers using the tick test to 
classify trades can achieve results that are close to the results which can be achieved using quote-based 
algorithm. Additionally, he also shows that, in at least some applications, the tick test could provide 
more accurate measures than quote-based methods.  
6 Tick rule has been used by researchers such as Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayer (1987), Lyons (1995) 
and Sias and Starks (1997) e.t.c. 
7 Two other alternative methods: the quote method, which classifies trade direction by comparing trade 
prices to quotes; Lee and Ready’s (1991) method, which employs the tick test for trades at the middle 
of the spread and quotes to infer all other trades. 
8 Green(2006) uses Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) algorithm to clarify the order. He shows that 
employing alternative approaches such as Lee and Ready (1991) or excluding trades insides the posted 
quotes, which may not be easy to classify correctly, does not significantly improve the results. 
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     To determine the impact of recommendations with target price on order flow, I 
measure order imbalances in dollars, IMBAL_DOLLAR, defined as the dollar value of 
purchases minus the dollar value of sales, as well as percentage order flow, IMBAL, 
takes the form: 
it it
it it
it Sells Buys
Sells Buys
IMBAL
+
−
=
, 
t it t it it P Sells P Buys DOLLAR IMBAL × − × = _  
Where  Buysit  and  Sellsit are the number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated 
transactions during time interval t (5 minutes) around announcement i. Pt is the price 
of the stock. Therefore, IMBALit=1 indicates all trades are buyer-initiated and 
IMBALit=-1 indicates all trades are seller-initiated.  
Table 13 reports the results regarding percentage and dollar order imbalances 40 
minutes before and after the announcement of recommendations with target price. It 
can be seen that there is a significant increase in buyer-initiated trading surrounding 
upgrades on event day, and the magnitude of the increase is relatively big comparing 
to the percentage of previous and next day. There is also a considerable increase in 
average dollar order imbalance. As to downgrades, there is a significant decrease in 
buyer-initiated trading around downgrades in the event day. During the -5 to 5 
interval, on average order imbalance percentage is 0.22% on trading day 5 minutes 
before the announcement of recommendation change and decline to -1.99% five 
minutes after a downgrade, whereas this percentage of the other two days are 6.35% 
and 3.75% respectively. The average order imbalance also decline from 12.10 to -
1.97. The dramatic declining trend persists in the following 15 minutes. While 
percentage of order imbalances is not generally negative following a downgrade, it is 
26 
 rather small compared to the results of previous and next day, which indicates that 
there is much less buyer-initiated trading due to the negative information arrival. 
 
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
 
Table 14 reports data on trading volume surrounding recommendation coupled with 
target price revisions. The average trading volume during the first five minutes of 
trading subsequent to recommendation changes is 23,678 shares per minute for 
upgrades and 23,221 shares per minute for downgrades. Throughout the 80 minutes 
surrounding the recommendation in the event day, the volume and dollar volume 
remain roughly twice as large as on the previous day. The results of trading dollar 
volume are similar. The results in Table14 provide additional evidence that market 
participants perceive the report of analyst valuable and trade correspondingly. There 
is a significant increase in the trading volume and dollar volume, indicating that the 
announcements boost the trading behavior greatly. The analysts’ efforts achieve their 
goal to convince investors to buy or sell stocks following their reports. Panel B and C 
of Figure 3 shows abnormal volume surrounding the announcements of 
recommendation with target price revisions. The abnormal volume is calculated as the 
result of the difference between the volume in the event day and the mean volume of 
previous and next day. It can be seen that the abnormal volume is economically 
significant associated with the pronounced cumulative market-adjusted returns. The 
levels and pattern are similar among the upgrade and downgrade recommendations. 
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 [Insert Table 14 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
 
The dramatic rise in trading activity coupled with a shift in order imbalances 
suggests that the market interprets recommendations with target price changes broadly 
as a liquidity event. Although not all market participants may be informed the 
recommendation changes, they may still consider the relatively large price change and 
increased trading as an opportunity to unwind a position. Additionally, the increase in 
trading activity can also boost the income of the brokerage house. Our findings can 
also be perceived as a strong support to Grossman and Stigliz (1980). Brokerage 
houses spend hundreds of millions of dollars analyzing stock and trying to persuade 
investors that some stocks are more or less attractive than others. Hence, the 
information is not without cost. In a competitive and rational world, brokerage’s 
activity should be compensated by commensurate expected profits in other forms, like 
underwriting fees, trading profits, and commissions from stock trading. Our evidence 
of increasing trading volume and dollar volume do support this view.  
5.2.4 Unconditional Intraday Informativeness of Target Prices 
 
    In this section of analysis, we will explore whether there exists significant market 
response to the information content of target price announcements surrounding those 
announcements. We calculate the abnormal return around each announcement and 
present mean returns for portfolios ranking based on the magnitude of the three target 
price information content measures (TP/P, ΔTP/TP-1, ΔTP/P). Market-adjusted return 
is calculated as the difference between the firm buy-and-hold return and the buy-and-
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 hold return on SPYDER
9 over the period beginning forty minutes prior to through 
forty minutes following the announcement of target price. These results are reported 
in Figure 4. 
The evidence in Figure 4 evinces that mean market-adjusted returns surrounding 
target price revisions are increasing in the favorableness of the target price and its 
revision. For instance, the average return for portfolio ranked on the basis of the 
percentage of published target price to the stock price of the latest transaction before 
the announcement of target price, TP/P, varies from an average of -1.73% for the least 
favorable target price revision to -0.65% for the most favorable one. This feature is 
much more obvious when we construct the portfolios on the basis of other two target 
price revisions. As to ΔTP/TP-1, the biggest gap in returns is observed, with mean 
returns varying from -4.44% to 2.20% for the least and most favorable revisions, 
respectively. The return of portfolios ranked on ΔTP/P also ranges from -3.84% to 
1.82%. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
 
These findings at intraday frequency are consistent with the findings of Brav and 
Lehavy’s (2003) work regarding the daily informativeness of target prices. 
Combining these findings with those findings in the previous literature of a significant 
positive (negative) intraday price reaction to favorable (unfavorable) stock 
recommendations ( e.g., Green (2006) and Juergens (2000)) supports the view that 
                                                            
9 Spyder tracks the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Stock Price Index. It is an ETF (Exchange 
Traded Fund) that represents ownership in the S&P 500 Index. 
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 market participants consider analyst price targets as informative signals concerning 
the value of a firm. Additionally, it raises an intriguing question concerning the 
incremental information content of target prices in the presence of recommendation. 
This question motivates us to investigate whether target price revisions are 
incrementally informative at intraday frequency. 
5.2.5 Intraday Informativeness of Target Prices Conditional on Stock 
Recommendation and Recommendation Revisions 
 
Table 15 reports the regression results relating intraday returns to types of 
recommendations (UPGRADES and DOWNGRADES), the magnitude of 
recommendation changes (RATING_CHANGE), and the target price revision measure 
(ΔTP/TP-1).  We begin our analysis with the announcements out of the regular trading 
time (16:00 PM~ 9:30 AM next day). Market-adjusted return (R) is calculated as the 
difference between the firm buy-and-hold return and the buy-and-hold return on the 
SPYDER
10 over the period from 16:00  previous day to 40 minutes following the 
open of the market (10:10). Our goal is to explore the informativeness of target prices 
disseminated out of the regular market hour. Additionally, we also obtain the result of 
the announcement disseminate during the regular market hour. The return (R) is 
computed as the difference between he firm buy-and-hold return and the buy-and-
hold return on the SPYDER over the period from forty minutes prior to through forty 
minutes following the announcement of target price. In the table 15, Panel A reports 
the regression results of announcement released out of the market hour, while Panel B 
reports the results announcement released during the market hour. 
 
                                                            
10 Spider tracks the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Stock Price Index. It is an ETF (Exchange 
Traded Fund) that represents ownership in the S&P 500 Index. 
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 [Insert Table 15 Here] 
 
    Firstly, we regress market-adjusted returns (R) on two recommendation revision 
categories, recommendation revision, RATING_CHANGE, and target price revisions 
ΔTP/TP-1. Our purpose is to investigate whether target price revisions are informative, 
controlling for recommendation and recommendation revisions. The regression 
formula takes the following form 
() ε γ β + ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛ Δ
+ + + =
−1
2 1   _      
TP
TP
CHANGE RATING DOWNGRADES α UPGRADES α R
Where the indicator variable-UPGRADES  (DOWNGRADES) equals 1 if 
recommendation is upgrade (downgrade) and 0 otherwise.
 
    The results of the regression are provided in column 1 of Panel A and Panel B 
indicate that target price revisions are positively and significant related to returns 
(γ=0.105 and 0.030 respectively), controlling for the information in the stock 
recommendation and change of rating. Additionally, we observe that the coefficients 
of  α2 are informative as well since both of the coefficients are economically and 
statistically significant. The coefficients of α1 are not economically and statistically 
significant. This pattern is consistent in both of the two regressions. We can 
understand that market participants more intend to rely on the information contained 
in target prices when issuing positive recommendation. Both of the signs of upgrade 
indicator are positive indicate that investors’ responses to positive recommendation 
are positive, while these evidences of downgrade are more significant.   
    The coefficients of rating change are not economically and statistically significant, 
indicating that the magnitude of rating change is not informative when controlling for 
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 the information in target prices and recommendations. It can be observed that among 
the two regressions the coefficients of target price revisions are economically and 
statistically significant, indicating that target price subsumes additional information 
compared to the other two information sources: type of recommendation and change 
in rating. The coefficients α1 and α2 and their expected ordering (α2<α1) demonstrate 
that the recommendation revisions are incrementally informative. 
    Another  interesting  question  is  whether the market response to target price 
revisions identical when recommendations are positive or negative, whether the 
market response identical after favorable and unfavorable target price revisions. This 
question motivate us to conduct two more sets of regressions to investigate whether 
the regression results-and, in particular, the conclusion about the informativeness of 
target price revisions-are sensitive to the type of recommendation and target price 
revision. Firstly, we run the regression conditional on the direction of the 
recommendation revision (columns 2-3). Secondly, the regression is conditional on 
the sign of the target price revision (columns 4-6). 
    In the first set of regression, we condition on the type of recommendation (upgrades 
and downgrades). It can be observed that target price revisions are related to larger 
returns when analysts issue recommendation downgrades (Panel A: γ=0.216 and 
Panel B: 0.045 respectively) compared to upgrades (Panel A: γ=0.029 and Panel B: 
0.021 respectively). The asymmetric reaction is consistent with the view that, 
provided that analysts’ unwilling (Womack (1996), Stickel (1995)) to put unfavorable 
recommendation revisions on firms, market participants would perceive downgrades 
as a more credible signal of information.  
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     Consider second the regression results when we condition on the sign of target 
price revisions (columns 4-6). Our motivation is to have a further understanding of the 
relation between returns and target price revisions in these specific settings. It can be 
seen that the slope coefficient of negative target price revisions (column 5) is 
economically larger than that of positive revisions (column 4). We also find that the 
information conveyed in rating change is still not obvious. The estimated coefficients 
are not economically and statistically significant across the three groups. The 
magnitude of coefficients is consistent with the results in columns 2-3.  
          When target prices are revised upward (column 4), the estimated coefficient 
becomes larger. It indicates that market-adjusted returns associated with 
recommendation upgrades become larger when such revision coincides with positive 
target price revisions.  However, we cannot find this pattern in recommendation 
downgrades. When target prices are revised downward (column 5) investors will 
choose to rely on the information contained in the target price revision. It can be 
viewed that the coefficients of target price revisions is the economically largest 
among all the regressions and the coefficients of recommendations become less 
economically and statistically significant (except for upgrades of the first regression). 
Hence, we believe that target price revision is the most informative when unfavorable 
recommendations in the presence of downward target price revisions. From the results 
in column 6, we find that the recommendations are the most economically and 
statistically significant if analyst maintains his previous price target. All the results 
above are consistent in panel A and panel B. 
In conclusion, the evidence presented in table 15 demonstrates that target prices are 
informative, both unconditionally and conditional on stock recommendation and 
change of ratings. We find that target price revisions are deemed more informative at 
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 intraday level when they are negative and when associated with recommendation 
downgrades. We also find that the recommendations are most informative when there 
is no target price revision. 
 
6.   Conclusions 
 
Using a database collected from the briefing.com, this paper provides evidence on 
the information role of target price. The data of target price ranges from 1999 to 2006. 
In addition to the traditional daily event study, our paper uses event study methods to 
analyze the price reactions to analysts’ announcements at the intraday frequency. The 
results can be summarized as follows: 
1)  In the event study, we find that target price provide incremental information 
value to analysts’ recommendation for the evidence that the investors’ reaction 
to recommendation coupled with the release of target price is more significant. 
Consistent with our prediction, target price subsumed in downgrade 
recommendation is the most informative while the target price in coverage 
reiteraton is the least informative. Investors can earn economically significant 
abnormal returns during 7-day window around the dissemination of a 
recommendation in the direction of that recommendation.   
2)  We also explore the difference of the magnitude of stock returns in response to 
target price revisions when analyst ratings are reiterated or initiated as buy, 
sell, or hold. Positive rating (buy) released in conjunction with target price 
earn a larger return than the rating without price target. Neutral ratings (hold) 
in conjunction with target price earn a larger return than the rating without 
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 target price. With regard to the negative rating (sell), it depends on the kind of 
recommendations. If it is coverage initiation, the target price is more 
informative. If it is coverage reiteration, it is less informative. Comparing the 
different recommendations in the same ratings, we find that the magnitude of 
returns for coverage initiation is larger than reiteration for positive rating (buy) 
in the event day. The pattern persists in the following two days. It is smaller 
than coverage reiteration for negative rating (sell) 3 days subsequent to the 
announcements, indicating a larger reaction from investors. As to the neutral 
rating (hold), it is larger than coverage reiteration. 
3)  First Call database enables us to extend our analysis at intraday frequency. It is 
well documented that the market open is quite different from the rest of the 
trading day in terms of higher volatility, returns, and trading volume (Harris 
(1986), Jain and Joh (1988)). Hence, we separate our data of sample into 
announcement released during and outside the regular trading hour. The 
pattern of investors’ reaction to recommendations with target price is 
consistent among the two samples: for upgrade, there is a significant positive 
return lasting 20 minutes; for downgrade, there is a significant negative return 
lasting 25 to 35 minutes. The pattern and levels of reaction are more 
pronounced in the sample of recommendations released outside the market 
hour. 
4)  We find that mean market-adjusted abnormal returns surrounding target price 
revisions are increasing in the favorableness of the target price revision. We 
develop three target price information measures: TP/P, ΔTP/TP-1, ΔTP/P to 
help us to study the investors’ reaction to target price at intraday frequency. 
We document that the market-adjusted returns of portfolios ranked on the 
35 
 basis of the magnitude of the last two information measures are more 
economically and statistically significant than the first measure, indicating that 
the information subsumed in target price revision is more useful than target 
price alone. Investors are more likely to respond to the information contained 
in the target price revision. Additionally, ΔTP/TP-1 is more informative than 
ΔTP/P. 
5)  More importantly, we find that target prices are informative both 
unconditionally and conditional on the type of recommendations and rating 
revision at intraday frequency. The target price revisions are more informative 
at intraday level when they are negative and when associated with 
recommendation downgrades. The investors seek out more information from 
target price revisions when recommendations are unfavorable. We also find 
that the recommendations are most informative when there is no target price 
revision. 
To conclude, there is strong evidence that target prices do provide incremental 
value to the recommendation, not only at the daily level but also at the intraday level.  
Anyone who investigates the impact of analysts’ recommendations on market prices 
should also consider the target prices made by analysts as well. 
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 Table 1 
The primary source of target price used in this study is collected from briefing.com, which is adopted by the online edition of Wall Street Journal. Table 1 provides a 
summary description of the analysts’ recommendations we collected from briefing.com. Panel A provides data on the characteristics of the analysts’ 
recommendations used in this study. The sample consists of 201,340 recommendations that were issued by the analysts between 1999 and 2006. The numbers of 
observations are presented for the entire sample period as well as on a year-by-year basis. Market capitalization (median), in millions of dollars, is as of month-end 
in the sample. Panel B reports the number of observation categorized by the ratings and target price.  
Panel A 
    Total  1999  2000  2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Coverage Reiteration  76,640  —  13,825 17,088  13,162  7,255 9,028 7,907 8,375 
Coverage Initiation  46,507  7,102  8,189  6,329  4,916 4,263 5,078 5,471 5,159 
Downgrade  41,821  4,111  5,326  6,713  5,672 4,770 4,859 4,791 5,579 
Upgrade  36,372  4,933  4,264  4,137  4,184 4,397 4,523 5,004 4,930 
Number of firms  7,258  4,015  4,085  3,711  3,332 3,127 3,437 3,747 3,920 
Market cap(mean)  9,499.72 8,186.22 12,586.34 10,973.05  8,901.00 7,859.30 8,486.35 8,328.84 8,450.08
Market cap(median)  1,603.51 1,232.13 1,861.72  1,694.50  1,416.12 1,467.63 1,639.92 1,682.50 1,671.92
Number of 
Recommendations Per 
firm 
28  4  8  9  8 7 7 6 6 
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 Panel B 
 
      Buy  Hold  Sell 
Recommendation Total 
With Target 
Price  
Without 
Target Price
With Target 
Price  
Without 
Target 
Price 
With Target 
Price  
Without 
Target Price 
Coverage  Reiteration  76,640  43,792  18,657  8,354 3,913 1,401  523 
Coverage Initiation  46,507  20,061 11,557  4,836  8,541  801  711 
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 Panel A and panel B report the average daily holding period abnormal returns (raw returns less the CRSP value-weighted market return over the 7 days centered on 
the recommendation announcement day 0), for coverage initiation and coverage reiteration. Buy, hold and sell fraction is in brackets. No target price represents the 
holding period abnormal return (raw returns less the CRSP value-weighted market return) of stock around the release of recommendations without target prices. The 
second column is the holding period abnormal return (raw returns less the CRSP value-weighted market return) of stock around the release of recommendations with 
target prices. T-value is calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) rule. 
Relative 
day(t)
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return
t-value
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return
t-value
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return
t-value
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return
t-value
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return
t-value
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return
t-value
-3 0.16% 4.36 0.17% 3.51 0.01% 0.13 0.01% 0.20 -0.01% -0.09 -0.03% -0.24
-2 0.19% 4.95 0.11% 2.24 0.01% 0.25 -0.04% -0.70 -0.14% -1.35 -0.05% -0.33
-1 0.18% 4.58 0.28% 5.40 -0.01% -0.20 0.01% 0.24 -0.23% -2.91 0.02% 0.14
0 1.62% 33.72 1.13% 17.06 -0.28% -5.59 -0.34% -6.64 -1.67% -13.29 -1.19% -8.19
1 0.29% 7.72 0.61% 10.98 -0.14% -2.92 -0.10% -2.22 -0.57% -4.81 -0.35% -3.24
2 0.05% 1.27 0.05% 0.94 -0.11% -2.17 -0.07% -1.63 -0.09% -0.80 -0.16% -1.21
3 0.02% 0.50 0.01% 0.26 -0.07% -1.21 -0.08% -1.84 -0.03% -0.33 -0.29% -2.12
-3 0.09% 4.02 0.04% 0.79 -0.03% -0.94 0.08% 0.99 -0.20% -2.81 0.39% 1.19
-2 0.10% 4.15 -0.02% -0.30 0.01% 0.38 0.01% 0.15 -0.14% -1.71 -0.16% -0.82
-1 0.12% 3.75 0.04% 0.73 -0.04% -0.62 -0.36% -3.35 -0.48% -3.32 -0.39% -1.51
0 0.70% 19.34 0.45% 7.20 -0.51% -7.44 -1.14% -7.88 -1.11% -5.51 -1.96% -5.56
1 0.10% 4.30 0.16% 3.34 0.00% -0.02 -0.27% -2.87 -0.23% -2.87 -0.68% -3.02
2 -0.02% -0.71 0.04% 0.84 -0.02% -0.52 -0.07% -0.89 -0.03% -0.37 -0.10% -0.62
3 0.03% 1.56 0.03% 0.73 0.01% 0.45 0.05% 0.61 0.03% 0.33 -0.01% -0.04
Panel B: Coverage reiteration
Panel A: Coverage initiation
Buy Hold Sell
Target Price No Target Price Target Price No Target Price Target Price No Target Price
 
Table 2 
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 Table 3 
This table reports the average daily holding period abnormal returns (raw returns less the CRSP value-
weighted market return over the 7 days centered on the recommendation announcement day 0), for 
upgrade and downgrade. No target price represents the holding period abnormal return (raw returns less 
the CRSP value-weighted market return) of stock around the release of recommendations without 
target prices. The second column is the holding period abnormal return (raw returns less the CRSP 
value-weighted market return) of stock around the release of recommendations with target prices. T-
value is calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) rule. 
   Upgrade     Downgrade  
   Target Price  No Target Price     Target Price  No Target Price 
Relative 
day(t) 
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return 
t-value 
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return 
t-value 
  
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return 
t-value 
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return 
t-value 
-3 -0.03%  -0.78  0.02%  0.52    0.06%  1.48  -0.05%  -1.76 
-2  -0.06% -1.74 -0.15% -3.99   -0.01%  -0.11  -0.02%  -0.42 
-1  0.30% 5.75 0.34% 7.28    -0.89%  -10.75  -0.80%  -15.16 
0 4.09%  59.98  3.16%  49.68    -5.10%  -47.31  -4.51%  -63.05 
1 0.43%  12.90  0.83%  15.79    -0.30%  -6.87  -0.73%  -15.35 
2  0.11% 3.63 0.22% 7.13    -0.12%  -2.84  -0.16%  -5.03 
3  0.16% 5.56 0.12% 4.23    -0.06%  -1.34  -0.08%  -2.79 
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 Table 4 
In this table, we divide the sample of upgrade and downgrade by year, and calculate the holding period 
abnormal returns at t=0. T-value is calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) rule. 
   Upgrade     Downgrade  
   Target Price  No Target Price     Target Price  No Target Price 
Year 
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return 
t-value 
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return 
t-value 
  
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return 
t-value 
Holding 
period 
abnormal 
return 
t-value 
1999  4.46% 11.55 2.12% 12.62    -5.16% -9.69 -3.45%  -14.09 
2000  4.69%  22.14  4.06%  19.49  -7.05% -20.77 -6.93% -30.21 
2001  4.08%  20.04  3.86%  19.05  -5.10% -15.77 -4.98% -28.13 
2002  3.61%  22.75  3.75%  12.31  -5.92% -22.01 -5.78% -26.32 
2003  4.82%  22.64  3.91%  19.45  -3.96% -21.78 -4.09% -27.49 
2004  3.68%  26.47  3.15%  27.05  -4.70% -18.40 -4.06% -28.21 
2005  3.69%  27.28  3.22%  32.37  -4.98% -17.86 -3.59% -28.02 
2006  3.92%  25.31  2.64%  27.00  -3.87% -16.74 -2.97% -25.76 
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Table 5 
This table reports the result of testing the differences of the mean and median abnormal holding period 
abnormal returns of the recommendations with and without target price at t=0 (event day). Wilcoxon 
sign-ranked test is used to test the differences of medians between the recommendations with and 
without target price (null hypothesis: difference is 0). Two sided student t-statistic test is used to test 
the differences of mean values (null hypothesis: difference is 0).   
 
Recommendation Wilcoxn P-value  Ttest  P-value 
Coverage 
Initiation 
Buy -10.06 0.00 -7.67 <.0001 
Hold 1.17 0.24 -1.01 0.31 
Sell 2.61 0.01 2.68 0.01 
Coverage 
Reiteration 
Buy -4.41 0.00 -4.16 <.0001 
Hold -3.41 0.00 -4.52 <.0001 
Sell -3.50 0.00 -1.99 0.05 
Upgrade   15.14 0.00 -12.05 <.0001 
Downgrade -6.94 0.00 5.78 <.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 Table 6 
For the exact time of the release of analyst report, we rely on First Call database. We merge our data 
with the First Call data sources by selecting records that have identical ticker, date, and brokerage 
house identity. Finally, we can get 7197 observations according to our principle. The time interval of 
these observations is from 1999 to 2006.The rating_change is the difference between the current and 
prior rating. I/B/E/S standardizes the ratings into five categories, each with an individual numeric 
value: 1-Strong Buy, 2-Buy, 3-Hold, 4-Underperform and 5-Sell. I.e. The rating change of 
downgrading from hold to sell is 2(=5-3). Target_change, ΔTP/TP (-1), is the percentage change in the 
brokerage house target price. Frequency equals to the number of the observations appear in the dataset. 
The percentage is the result of dividing the frequency by the total number of the observations. Panel A 
provides the information of the target change sorted by the change of rating. In Panel B, we separate 
the change of target price into ten intervals and obtain the average rating change respectively. 
Panel A: Average Target Price Change 
Rating_change Frequency  Percentage Target_change 
-4 17  0.24%  53.57% 
-3 1  0.01%  -6.67% 
-2 1043  14.49%  25.27% 
-1 2357  32.75%  21.69% 
0 3  0.04%  51.39% 
1 2620  36.40%  -16.84% 
2 1094  15.20%  -18.44% 
3 38  0.53%  -7.16% 
4 23  0.32%  -29.34% 
5 1  0.01%  -28.57% 
Total 7197  100.00%  1.84% 
Panel B: Average Rating Change 
Target_change  Frequency Percentage  Rating_change 
less than -80%  17  0.24%  1.67 
from -80% to -60%  132  1.83%  1.38 
from -60% to -40%  487  6.77%  1.29 
from -40% to -20%  1034  14.37%  1.23 
from -20% to  0%  2006  27.87%  0.70 
from 0% to 20%  1962  27.26%  -0.63 
from 20% to 40%  975  13.55%  -1.09 
from 40% to 60%  329  4.57%  -1.17 
from 60% to 80%  121  1.68%  -1.28 
bigger than 80%  134  1.86%  -1.32 
Total 7197  100.00%  0.07 
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 Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics on Measures of the Information Content of Target Price 
This table reports the general statistics on the three target price information measures. (1) the 
magnitude of the change in the brokerage house target price revision denoted ΔTP/TP (-1), (2) the ratio 
of the target price to the stock price(the last transaction just before the target price announced) 
represented by TP/P,(3) the change in the target price, deflated by the stock price denoted ΔTP/P.  For 
each column, we delete the missing variable if any of the measure is missing value. 
  
Target_change 
(ΔTP/TP (-1)) 
Target_price 
(TP/P)                
Change_price 
(ΔTP/P)                
Mean 1.84%  1.20  -12.81% 
Max 400.00%  18.88  238.51% 
75th percentile  17.86%  1.27  17.97% 
Median 0.00%  1.16  0.00% 
25th percentile  -17.65%  1.06  -23.98% 
Min -91.7%  32.3%  -1012.05% 
Std.Dev 32.92%  0.35  66.05% 
N 7197  7197  7197 
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 Table 8 
 Intraday Market-adjusted Returns Following Recommendations with Target Price 
Changes Released out of the Market Hour 
The table reports average return for 40 minutes following the market release of analyst stock target 
price change. The announcement is published outside of the market hour (16:00~9:30). Return and p-
value are reported. The data consists of 5517 observations. It includes 2640 upgrade and 2877 
downgrade. The average percentages of the three information measures are also reported respectively. 
 
Upgrade   Downgrade 
Return P-value Return  P-value 
16:00~9:30  3.31% <.0001  -5.26% <.0001 
9:35  0.18% 0.00  -0.66%  <.0001 
9:40  0.07% 0.01  -0.12% 0.00 
9:45  0.04% 0.08  -0.13%  <.0001 
9:50  0.07%   <.0001  -0.13%  <.0001 
9:55  0.02% 0.20  -0.09%  <.0001 
10:00  0.04% 0.01  -0.06% 0.01 
10:05  0.03% 0.05  -0.04% 0.02 
10:10  0.02% 0.17     -0.02% 0.25 
Target_change 0.23  -0.17 
Rating_change -1.30  1.30 
Target_price 1.24  1.15 
Change_price 0.19     -0.40 
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Table 9 
Intraday Market-adjusted Returns Following Recommendations with Target Price 
Changes Released during the Market Hour 
The table reports average return for 40 minutes at 5 minutes interval before and after the market release 
of analyst stock target price revisions. The announcement is published during the market hour. Return 
and p-value are reported. The data consists of 1680 observations. It includes 778 upgrades and 902 
downgrades. 
Mean P-value Mean P-value
-40 0.08% 0.02 -0.08% 0.03
-35 0.14% 0.01 -0.17% 0.01
-30 0.12% 0.00 -0.18% 0.00
-25 0.17% 0.01 -0.39% 0.00
-20 0.28%  <.0001 -0.23% 0.00
-15 0.20% 0.00 -0.35% <.0001
-10 0.20%  <.0001 -0.33% 0.00
-5 0.28%  <.0001 -0.33% <.0001
5 0.11%  <.0001 -0.12% 0.00
10 0.08% 0.00 -0.09% 0.00
15 0.08% 0.00 -0.08% 0.00
20 0.04% 0.09 -0.06% 0.03
25 0.03% 0.15 -0.05% 0.08
30 0.02% 0.37 -0.03% 0.20
35 0.03% 0.11 -0.03% 0.12
40 0.01% 0.68 0.01% 0.59
Target_change
Rating_change
Target_price
Change_price
Upgrade Downgrade
0.23
-1.38
1.26
0.18
-0.19
1.41
1.17
-0.47  
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 Table 10 
Intraday Cumulative Returns of the Stock Following the Target Revisions (ΔTP/TP-1) Released during the Market Hour 
The data consists of 1680 target price revisions between 1997 and 2006 which is released during the regular market hour. On the basis of the magnitude of target 
revisions, we construct deciles portfolios. Market adjusted cumulative return is calculated as the difference between market adjusted return from t=-35,-30…40 
relative to time t=-40. The cumulative returns and the t-value are presented for each portfolio.  
 
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulat
ive
T_valu
e
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_valu
e
Cumulati
ve
T_valu
e
Cumulati
ve
T_valu
e
Cumulati
ve
T_valu
e
Cumulati
ve
T_valu
e
-40 -0.18% -1.76 0.08% 0.83 -0.17% -1.18 -0.11% -1.99 0.04% 1.12 0.00% -0.02 0.10% 1.75 0.05% 1.18 0.18% 2.56 -0.04% -0.44
-35 -0.49% -2.81 -0.28% -0.93 -0.32% -1.77 -0.15% -2.22 0.06% 1.37 0.04% 0.54 0.15% 2.40 0.06% 1.02 0.39% 2.71 0.24% 1.03
-30 -0.77% -3.90 -0.66% -1.70 -0.25% -1.43 -0.37% -1.96 0.04% 0.81 0.04% 0.45 0.25% 3.03 0.18% 1.55 0.45% 2.76 0.41% 1.66
-25 -1.63% -3.02 -1.13% -2.38 -0.54% -2.30 -0.52% -2.67 -0.14% -1.01 0.04% 0.36 0.35% 3.71 0.17% 1.14 0.65% 2.61 0.73% 1.96
-20 -2.04% -3.57 -1.37% -2.84 -0.85% -2.83 -0.62% -3.05 -0.13% -0.92 0.06% 0.48 0.46% 4.17 0.27% 1.66 1.28% 3.48 0.98% 2.27
-15 -2.51% -3.88 -2.08% -3.62 -1.07% -3.04 -0.84% -3.64 -0.28% -1.06 0.09% 0.65 0.58% 4.46 0.58% 2.94 1.44% 3.98 1.14% 2.37
-10 -3.18% -4.20 -2.33% -3.89 -1.40% -3.77 -1.11% -4.33 -0.26% -1.21 0.13% 0.92 0.82% 5.27 0.74% 3.49 1.49% 4.31 1.35% 2.43
-5 -3.56% -4.60 -2.68% -4.45 -1.81% -4.35 -1.10% -3.41 -0.70% -2.20 0.17% 1.15 1.02% 5.95 0.79% 3.76 1.76% 4.58 1.68% 2.99
5 -3.67% -4.67 -2.81% -4.62 -2.01% -4.57 -1.19% -3.63 -0.87% -2.56 0.18% 1.12 1.14% 6.31 0.88% 4.00 1.95% 4.86 1.78% 3.10
10 -3.77% -4.77 -2.81% -4.60 -2.08% -4.74 -1.29% -3.72 -0.97% -2.72 0.12% 0.68 1.21% 6.41 1.05% 4.54 1.91% 4.80 1.92% 3.35
15 -3.93% -4.86 -2.80% -4.54 -2.08% -4.64 -1.36% -3.97 -1.05% -2.88 0.18% 1.00 1.26% 6.17 1.01% 4.29 1.98% 4.82 1.97% 3.50
20 -4.18% -5.11 -2.86% -4.49 -2.11% -4.62 -1.33% -3.82 -1.06% -2.88 0.17% 0.92 1.31% 6.31 0.98% 4.08 1.96% 4.88 2.11% 3.65
25 -4.28% -5.08 -3.03% -4.72 -2.09% -4.63 -1.38% -3.95 -1.04% -2.88 0.23% 1.25 1.36% 6.28 1.00% 4.09 1.98% 4.90 2.09% 3.65
30 -4.36% -5.21 -3.12% -4.76 -2.08% -4.62 -1.35% -3.77 -1.03% -2.94 0.22% 1.17 1.42% 6.44 0.98% 3.94 1.96% 4.91 2.16% 3.77
35 -4.47% -5.31 -3.14% -4.81 -2.06% -4.58 -1.35% -3.70 -1.05% -3.00 0.22% 1.09 1.44% 6.82 0.98% 3.83 1.95% 5.01 2.23% 3.84
40 -4.44% -5.21 -3.18% -4.84 -1.94% -4.20 -1.35% -3.78 -1.03% -2.95 0.20% 0.94 1.43% 6.94 1.02% 4.00 1.91% 4.87 2.20% 3.84
Target_change
7th Quintile 8th Quintile 9th Quintile 10th Quintile 1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile 6th Quintile
0.10 0.18 0.29 0.67 -0.52 -0.32 -0.21 -0.13 -0.06 0.02  
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Table 11 
 Intraday Cumulative Returns of the Stock Following the Information Measure ΔTP/P Released during the Market Hour 
The data consists of 1680 target price revisions between 1997 and 2006 which is released during the regular market hour. On the basis of the magnitude of measure, 
we construct deciles portfolios. Market adjusted cumulative return is calculated as the difference between market adjusted return from t=-35,-30…40 relative to time 
t=-40. The cumulative returns and the p-value are presented for each portfolio.   
 
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value Cumulative T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value Cumulative T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
-40 -0.08% -0.66 -0.05% -0.79 -0.17% -1.20 -0.09% -1.83 0.06% 1.45 -0.01% -0.28 0.07% 1.57 0.09% 1.77 0.15% 1.99 -0.02% -0.20
-35 -0.25% -1.48 -0.51% -1.64 -0.37% -2.08 -0.12% -1.90 0.08% 1.71 0.02% 0.32 0.11% 1.92 0.16% 2.34 0.54% 2.20 0.06% 0.45
-30 -0.45% -2.09 -0.87% -2.25 -0.43% -2.48 -0.34% -1.81 0.07% 1.41 0.03% 0.29 0.21% 2.48 0.28% 2.40 0.63% 2.53 0.18% 1.15
-25 -1.30% -2.32 -1.41% -3.04 -0.69% -3.07 -0.48% -2.50 -0.09% -0.60 0.02% 0.24 0.25% 2.42 0.34% 2.36 0.84% 2.68 0.49% 1.52
-20 -1.77% -3.02 -1.54% -3.25 -1.04% -3.61 -0.58% -2.90 -0.07% -0.47 0.05% 0.38 0.35% 3.08 0.71% 2.42 1.28% 3.28 0.67% 1.99
-15 -2.23% -3.36 -2.13% -3.77 -1.39% -4.07 -0.75% -3.25 -0.28% -1.09 0.08% 0.55 0.49% 3.70 0.99% 3.29 1.44% 3.56 0.84% 2.19
-10 -2.81% -3.61 -2.47% -4.20 -1.72% -4.81 -1.06% -4.08 -0.24% -1.15 0.13% 0.90 0.65% 4.48 1.14% 3.82 1.60% 3.80 1.00% 2.18
-5 -3.12% -3.93 -3.02% -4.91 -1.89% -4.75 -1.28% -4.06 -0.50% -2.06 0.17% 1.11 0.87% 5.49 1.33% 4.02 1.72% 4.15 1.34% 2.77
5 -3.23% -4.00 -3.30% -5.23 -1.92% -4.76 -1.43% -4.36 -0.62% -2.46 0.17% 1.07 0.96% 6.20 1.49% 4.26 1.88% 4.27 1.43% 2.94
10 -3.32% -4.09 -3.23% -5.13 -2.04% -5.05 -1.56% -4.40 -0.70% -2.62 0.11% 0.65 1.03% 6.37 1.60% 4.43 1.92% 4.41 1.55% 3.23
15 -3.42% -4.11 -3.27% -5.04 -2.05% -5.16 -1.67% -4.74 -0.76% -2.83 0.17% 0.96 1.07% 6.08 1.58% 4.30 1.91% 4.51 1.67% 3.40
20 -3.61% -4.28 -3.33% -5.00 -2.11% -5.06 -1.64% -4.65 -0.79% -2.98 0.16% 0.88 1.07% 6.09 1.56% 4.25 1.94% 4.60 1.79% 3.54
25 -3.77% -4.36 -3.43% -5.11 -2.11% -5.15 -1.67% -4.77 -0.80% -2.93 0.22% 1.18 1.15% 6.19 1.57% 4.23 1.95% 4.68 1.79% 3.53
30 -3.81% -4.43 -3.54% -5.15 -2.13% -5.26 -1.64% -4.59 -0.79% -2.94 0.21% 1.12 1.19% 6.32 1.56% 4.24 1.89% 4.48 1.88% 3.75
35 -3.88% -4.49 -3.57% -5.18 -2.13% -5.30 -1.63% -4.52 -0.83% -3.04 0.21% 1.05 1.21% 6.78 1.56% 4.20 1.95% 4.53 1.90% 3.79
40 -3.84% -4.39 -3.49% -5.01 -2.13% -5.28 -1.60% -4.61 -0.83% -3.00 0.19% 0.90 1.22% 6.82 1.56% 4.23 1.97% 4.51 1.82% 3.76
Change_price
7th Quintile 8th Quintile 9th Quintile 10th Quintile 1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile 6th Quintile
0.10 0.18 0.28 0.52 -1.70 -0.54 -0.31 -0.17 -0.07 0.02  
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 The data consists of 1680 target price revisions between 1997 and 2006 which is released during the regular market hour. On the basis of the magnitude of measure, 
we construct deciles portfolios. Market adjusted cumulative return is calculated as the difference between market adjusted return from t=-35,-30…40 relative to time 
t=-40. The cumulative returns and the p-value are presented for each portfolio.   
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
Cumulati
ve
T_value
-40 -0.14% -1.79 -0.02% -0.45 0.01% 0.19 -0.13% -0.90 0.01% 0.25 0.04% 0.75 -0.03% 0.75 0.06% 0.76 0.04% 0.56 0.08% 0.73
-35 0.15% 0.66 -0.15% -1.63 -0.11% -0.79 -0.16% -0.88 -0.04% -0.55 -0.10% -0.36 0.02% -0.36 0.04% 0.46 0.02% 0.20 0.03% 0.16
-30 -0.15% -0.48 -0.21% -2.10 -0.02% -0.19 -0.33% -1.38 -0.11% -1.08 0.03% 0.09 0.16% 0.09 -0.05% -0.43 0.03% 0.22 -0.02% -0.08
-25 -0.54% -1.31 -0.39% -2.50 -0.08% -0.58 0.00% -0.01 -0.22% -1.52 -0.02% -0.05 -0.01% -0.05 -0.08% -0.50 -0.06% -0.22 -0.57% -1.16
-20 -0.23% -0.43 -0.54% -2.64 -0.37% -1.75 -0.15% -0.35 -0.03% -0.20 0.04% 0.12 0.19% 0.12 -0.08% -0.41 0.08% 0.28 -0.81% -1.59
-15 -0.44% -0.79 -1.07% -3.55 -0.48% -2.02 -0.23% -0.47 -0.04% -0.18 -0.01% -0.03 0.21% -0.03 0.09% 0.42 0.09% 0.33 -0.98% -1.59
-10 -0.79% -1.21 -1.29% -3.62 -0.52% -2.21 -0.42% -0.80 -0.09% -0.36 0.04% 0.10 0.09% 0.10 0.09% 0.33 0.12% 0.41 -0.89% -1.37
-5 -1.12% -1.65 -1.31% -3.66 -0.62% -2.57 -0.37% -0.69 -0.22% -0.76 0.04% 0.10 0.18% 0.10 0.06% 0.20 0.18% 0.49 -1.00% -1.42
5 -1.15% -1.68 -1.38% -3.88 -0.67% -2.64 -0.36% -0.66 -0.32% -1.05 0.07% 0.17 0.31% 0.17 0.05% 0.16 0.22% 0.54 -1.08% -1.49
10 -1.19% -1.74 -1.42% -3.95 -0.81% -2.87 -0.41% -0.74 -0.34% -1.05 0.05% 0.11 0.33% 0.11 0.12% 0.38 0.26% 0.66 -0.96% -1.31
15 -1.32% -1.93 -1.54% -4.21 -0.82% -2.98 -0.50% -0.90 -0.29% -0.89 0.01% 0.03 0.35% 0.03 0.11% 0.36 0.39% 0.94 -0.86% -1.13
20 -1.45% -2.07 -1.59% -4.19 -0.87% -3.02 -0.51% -0.94 -0.31% -0.96 -0.08% -0.18 0.45% -0.18 0.16% 0.52 0.35% 0.83 -0.80% -1.01
25 -1.50% -2.19 -1.58% -4.15 -0.95% -3.28 -0.50% -0.93 -0.32% -1.00 -0.09% -0.20 0.49% -0.20 0.15% 0.48 0.39% 0.94 -0.87% -1.06
30 -1.59% -2.30 -1.56% -4.06 -0.95% -3.16 -0.56% -1.02 -0.35% -1.04 -0.09% -0.21 0.46% -0.21 0.13% 0.40 0.46% 1.08 -0.79% -0.98
35 -1.73% -2.46 -1.53% -3.98 -0.93% -3.08 -0.49% -0.90 -0.35% -1.05 -0.14% -0.31 0.44% -0.31 0.15% 0.46 0.45% 1.07 -0.75% -0.93
40 -1.73% -2.46 -1.53% -3.82 -0.88% -3.00 -0.54% -1.00 -0.34% -1.03 -0.12% -0.27 0.41% -0.27 0.15% 0.45 0.41% 1.00 -0.65% -0.79
Target_pr
i
7th Quintile 8th Quintile 9th Quintile 10th Quintile 1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile 6th Quintile
1.23 1.30 1.40 1.88 0.83 0.99 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.19
 Intraday Cumulative Returns of the Stock Following the Information Measure TP/P Released during the Market Hour 
Table 12 
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 Table 13 Order Imbalance surrounding Recommendations with Target Price 
Revisions 
The table reports measures of trading activity during a three-day window surrounding the 
recommendation with target price revisions. The data consists of 778 upgrade and 902 downgrade 
recommendations.  
Panel A Average percentage order imbalance 
This table reports the mean percentage order imbalance taken the form as (number of buys – number of 
sells)/(number of buys + number of sells). 
Previous Day Event Day Next Day Previous Day Event Day Next Day
-40 4.13% 8.00% 6.44% 7.16% 2.32% 1.14%
-35 6.35% 6.92% 8.07% 6.27% 0.00% -1.06%
-30 5.26% 6.67% 4.85% 8.61% -0.05% 3.48%
-25 7.11% 7.24% 8.84% 4.59% 0.68% 1.82%
-20 4.02% 9.17% 5.12% 6.02% 2.84% 3.96%
-15 4.01% 10.32% 6.77% 8.28% 2.32% 6.54%
-10 3.07% 9.70% 5.77% 8.96% 1.77% 3.36%
-5 0.37% 9.92% 9.12% 4.22% 0.22% 1.97%
5 2.67% 7.62% 5.52% 6.35% -1.99% 3.79%
10 3.44% 9.34% 5.92% 3.23% 2.65% 2.55%
15 5.28% 8.47% 5.51% 6.34% 1.46% 1.58%
20 0.51% 6.24% 5.30% 4.26% 0.85% 1.62%
25 5.97% 7.12% 7.09% 5.78% 0.11% 3.73%
30 2.44% 4.36% 4.51% 5.07% 2.62% 4.58%
35 0.48% 4.83% 2.81% 4.64% 3.01% 1.91%
40 2.31% 4.88% 4.62% 3.28% 0.73% 2.96%
Upgrade Downgrade
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 Panel B Average Dollar Order Imbalance (in $thousands per minutes) 
This table reports the mean dollar order imbalance defined as (dollar value of buys – dollar value of 
sells). 
Previous Day Event Day Next Day Previous Day Event Day Next Day
-40 16.33 59.38 49.72 4.72  10.77  26.92
-35 -1.22 96.75 22.59 31.29 -7.26 9.67
-30 13.87 116.00 50.14 26.39 -24.86 0.94
-25 28.81 85.88 45.19 18.91 -56.59 30.58
-20 -9.40 82.45 20.09 32.16 2.31 12.16
-15 28.57 70.08 34.70 2.77 -36.68 40.00
-10 14.74 61.87 46.17 31.65 -20.51 32.65
-5 10.83 45.55 52.26 20.16 12.10 13.31
5 -5.28 32.77 28.67 15.08 -1.97 20.76
10 8.43 42.00 -15.89 23.21 -24.12 22.88
15 32.79 80.74 10.25 17.39 -27.43 -1.45
20 9.33 36.89 8.00 15.23 -10.00 -5.60
25 -3.97 58.15 16.34 13.47 -2.03 11.37
30 -0.14 54.41 10.36 24.01 15.17 9.39
35 -6.19 29.97 17.22 8.00 -19.22 -2.15
40 1.86 42.78 10.89 5.36 10.38 7.29
Upgrade Downgrade
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 Table 14 Trading Activity surrounding Analyst Recommendation with Target Price 
Revisions  
The table reports measures of trading activity surrounding the release of analyst stock recommendation 
changes. Panel A reports the mean volume of trading for the period beginning forty minutes prior and 
ending forty minutes subsequent to recommendation changes at 5-minute interval. Panel B reports the 
mean dollar volume of trading for the period beginning forty minutes prior and ending forty minutes 
subsequent to recommendation changes at 5-minute interval. The data consists of 778 upgrade and 902 
downgrade recommendation.  
Panel A: Average volume (in shares per minute) 
 
Previous Day Event Day Next Day Previous Day Event Day  Next Day
‐40 7,933.97 22,520.56 12,864.13 7,820.11 24,085.70 12,473.36
‐35 8,001.43 23,295.75 11,743.76 7,574.73 22,539.25 11,442.95
‐30 9,152.97 22,709.59 12,458.41 7,240.32 22,493.38 12,491.18
‐25 8,820.75 19,692.52 11,190.43 6,923.91 21,888.57 11,217.58
‐20 9,624.76 19,854.32 13,235.70 8,316.93 21,071.51 10,607.57
‐15 9,743.58 25,471.14 14,660.77 8,129.68 22,957.40 10,359.61
‐10 9,991.90 24,295.70 11,827.52 8,274.34 22,171.51 10,455.39
‐5 10,590.43 22,340.18 11,861.82 8,342.34 22,484.94 9,827.02
5 11,989.25 23,678.02 11,647.77 8,671.97 23,221.42 10,800.74
10 11,400.42 20,812.36 12,334.54 8,300.97 24,021.25 9,947.19
15 10,836.99 20,025.26 11,427.06 8,079.15 20,819.15 9,425.14
20 8,752.40 17,531.77 11,619.66 8,062.10 20,427.37 9,503.71
25 9,214.49 17,818.47 10,374.25 7,679.16 18,982.61 9,491.21
30 8,394.07 17,326.73 9,854.95 6,942.09 17,759.24 8,924.69
35 9,324.55 15,227.76 9,206.54 7,194.10 17,672.91 8,487.84
40 8,955.35 15,096.55 8,256.16 6,950.85 16,121.51 8,775.35
Upgrade Downgrade
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 Panel B: Average dollar volume (in $thousands per minute) 
 
Previous Day Event Day Next Day Previous Day Event Day Next Day
‐40 237.09 577.18 295.64 202.67 585.33 293.44
‐35 234.81 620.31 306.20 209.58 541.59 274.86
‐30 291.51 787.22 339.14 202.30 548.73 315.49
‐25 281.73 593.02 317.30 192.72 542.55 277.63
‐20 294.30 607.67 364.72 223.22 509.52 266.04
‐15 291.84 648.29 343.45 202.97 573.99 259.37
‐10 278.01 600.42 308.28 213.85 553.05 271.07
‐5 280.17 580.03 293.52 212.91 572.95 255.63
5 300.64 579.15 282.92 204.60 602.43 251.18
10 303.60 542.04 344.08 216.99 585.38 239.55
15 280.63 540.01 271.54 203.14 513.28 228.44
20 237.40 451.56 281.71 205.82 488.28 230.58
25 239.76 469.14 256.45 192.45 465.19 230.85
30 225.99 433.97 245.46 172.81 440.37 217.55
35 252.11 389.61 229.56 185.11 434.96 226.16
40 261.02 387.91 206.63 182.12 396.09 219.22
Upgrade Downgrade
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 Table 15:  Intraday Relative Informativeness of Analyst Target Price, Stock Recommendation Type, and Magnitude of Rating Change 
Panel A reports the regression results of the return of the recommendation released out of the market hour, which consists of 2640 upgrade and 2877 downgrade. 
Market-adjusted abnormal return (R) is calculated as the difference between the firm buy-and-hold return and the buy-and-hold return on the SPYDER over the 
period from 16:00 previous day to 40 minutes following the open of the market (10:10).Panel B reports the regression of the return of the recommendation 
announced in the market hour, which consists of 778 upgrade and 902 downgrade. The market-adjusted abnormal return (R) is computed as the difference between 
the firm buy-and-hold return and the buy-and-hold return on the SPYDER over the period from forty minutes prior to through forty minutes following the 
announcement of target price. The table reports regression results in which the dependent variable is the return surrounding the target price announcements and the 
independent variables are indicator variables for analyst recommendations, the magnitude of recommendation revision, and target price revisions. The 
recommendation indicator variables equal 1 for the relevant recommendation and 0 otherwise. The recommendation categories are upgrades and downgrades. The 
magnitude of recommendation revision is measured as the difference between current rating and previous rating. Target price revision is computed as the percentage 
change in the brokerage house current and prior target price scaled by the prior target price.    
Panel A: 
Variable 
      Direction of Recommendation Revision     Sign of Target Price Revision 
All Observations  Upgrades  Downgrades Positive  Negative  Zero 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
α1 (Upgrade indicator)  0.006     0.024          0.030    0.053    0.044 
0.82 7.9  9.5  2.08  5.48 
α2 (Downgrade indicator)  -0.038  -0.017  -0.023  0.024  -0.034 
-5.18 -1.33  -6.1  1.36  -4.44 
β(Recommendation revision)  -0.005  -0.005  -0.007  -0.001  -0.008  0.002 
-0.98 -2.1  -0.78  -0.53 -0.69  0.33 
γ(Price target revision)  0.105  0.029  0.216  0.025  0.347 
11.03 8.01  10.75  6.3  10.31 
Adjusted R
2 9.2%  33.0%  9.3%  30.6%  10.4%  28.4% 
N  5,517     2,641    2,876     2,752    2,310    455 
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Panel B 
 
Variable 
      Direction of Recommendation Revision     Sign of Target Price Revision 
All Observations  Upgrades  Downgrades Positive  Negative  Zero 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
α1 (Upgrade indicator)  0.004     0.011          0.014    0.013    0.017 
1.03 2.22  2.77  1.17  2.4 
α2 (Downgrade indicator)  -0.012  -0.006  -0.016  0.004  -0.009 
-2.76 -0.95  -2.61  0.48  -1.15 
β(Recommendation revision)  -0.005  -0.002  -0.008  0.000  -0.010  -0.002 
-2.07 -0.74  -1.95 -0.07 -2.1  -0.44 
γ(Price target revision)  0.030  0.021  0.045  0.019  0.068 
5.48 3.7  4.47  3.08  4.33 
Adjusted R
2 14.0%  14.8%  14.0%  14.6%  14.6%  23.1% 
N  1,680     778    902     769    794    117 Figure 1 7-day Average Excess Returns for All Recommendations. Average excess returns 
for coverage reiterated (Panel A), coverage initiated (Panel B) and upgrade and downgrade (Panel C) 
for 7 days centered on the recommendation event date (t= -3 to 3). The holding period abnormal returns 
equal to the raw returns less the CRSP value-weighted market return. 
Panel A 
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 Panel B 
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 Panel C 
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 Figure 2 Excess Returns for Upgrade and Downgrade with and without Target Price by Year 
 Average excess returns for upgrade (Panel A) and downgrade (Panel B) with and without target price 
in the event day. We divide the sample of upgrade and downgrade by year, and calculate the holding 
period abnormal returns in the event day. The holding period abnormal returns equal to the raw returns 
less the CRSP value-weighted market return. 
Panel A 
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 Panel B 
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 Figure 3 Intraday Cumulative Market-adjusted Abnormal Returns surrounding the 
Announcement of Recommendation with Target Price  
Panel A plots the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns for the 5-minute intervals over the 
period 40 minutes following the announcement. Panel B and C report plot mean cumulative market-
adjusted abnormal return and volume for upgrade and downgrade with target price revisions. Mean 
returns for stocks upgrade (Panel B) and downgrade (Panel C) for 80 minutes centered on the 
announcement event time (t=-40 to 40). The abnormal volume is calculated as the result of the 
difference between the volume in the event day and the mean volume of previous and next day. 
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 Panel B-Upgrade Recommendation with Target Price Revisions-Return and Volume 
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 Panel C-Downgrade Recommendation with Target Price Revisions-Return and Volume 
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 Figure 4 Mean Market-adjusted Abnormal Return around Announcement of 
Target Prices. This figure plots average market buy-and-hold market-adjusted abnormal returns for 
the period beginning forty minutes prior and ending forty minutes subsequent to the firm’s target price 
announcement for deciles portfolios sort on the basis of three target price information measures. 
Market-adjusted abnormal return is calculated as the difference between the firm buy-and-hold return 
and the buy-and-hold return on the SPYDER. The information content measures are (1) the magnitude 
of the change in the brokerage house target price revision denoted ΔTP/TP-1, (2) the ratio of the target 
price to the stock price(the last transaction just before the target price announced) represented by 
TP/P,(3) the change in the target price, deflated by the stock price denoted ΔTP/P. 
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